This paper provides an overview of poverty and well-being trends in India since the mid-1990s. Poverty reduction since 2005 has been much faster than the earlier decade, as a result of broad-based growth across most geographic areas. Underlying this is a pattern of high mobility in economic status that has led to an emerging middle class. Still, a vast (and rising) share of the population faces significant risk of slipping back into poverty. India's poor are increasingly concentrated in low-income states with historically lower rates of economic progress. Even as India has reduced poverty faster than the developing world as a whole, the degree of poverty reduction associated with growth has been substantially lower than in some of its middle-income peers. India faces important challenges in nonmonetary dimensions of welfare as well. Despite success on important fronts, such as infant and child mortality and secondary education, progress has been slow in others, such as sanitation and nutrition, and lags behind some other countries that are at a similar stage of development.
Introduction
Assessing how poverty and related measures of well-being have evolved, and understanding the pathways to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity in India are issues of central importance for the country and for the world. The Government of India's (GoI) 12 th Five Year Plan recognizes poverty reduction based on faster, sustainable and more inclusive growth as its key objective and lays out ambitious targets for reducing poverty by 10 percentage points over the 2012-17 Plan period. From the global perspective, India in 2012 is home to 26 percent of the global poor at the newly updated $1.90 (2011 PPP) international poverty line. This implies that meeting the global target of an extreme poverty rate of 3 percent by 2030 (and an interim target of 9 percent by 2020) -originally adopted by the World Bank and now a key element of the Sustainable Development Goals that the global community has set for itself -will be impossible unless India makes substantial inroads in reducing poverty. This paper examines the evolution of poverty and well-being in India since the mid-1990s, focusing primarily on the decade of the 2000s and placing India's experience in the context of that of the developing world. Section 2 presents the trends and patterns of consumption poverty over two decades, comparing the periods of 1993-94 to 2004-05 and 2004-05 to 2011-12. It also looks at trends of consumption growth, inequality, the recently adopted World Bank Group indicator of shared prosperity, and the extent of mobility of households over time that help understand the dynamics underlying the headline poverty numbers. Section 3 assesses progress in key non-monetary indicators of welfare that have intrinsic as well as instrumental value for welfare, comparing these with the monetary poverty trends. Section 4 looks at the spatial pattern of poverty reduction across states, to examine whether the historically large gaps between high and low income states have converged over time. Section 5 uses cross-country comparisons to analyze how India's progress in poverty reduction and non-monetary dimensions of welfare compares with the rest of the developing world and peers among middle-income countries. Section 6 addresses the question of what rate of progress is needed in India in order for the world to achieve its global goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030, and what would be needed for such progress to occur. Section 7 concludes the paper, summarizing the key findings.
3 between 1994 and 2005, fell a further 15 percentage points in the next seven years, with similar patterns seen in both rural and urban areas (Figure 1 ). This was a three-fold increase in pace, as the country reduced poverty by 2.2 percentage points per year during 2005-2012, relative to the 0.7 percentage point per year decline between 1994 and 2005 ( Figure 2 ). 2 The period between 2005 and 2012 also contains two distinct phases: a moderate rate of poverty reduction till 2010 (which was still more than twice the rate of change seen between 1994 and 2005), followed by sharp and unprecedented reduction between 2010 and 2012.
Some of this volatility needs to be seen in the context of 2009-10 being a year of particularly severe droughts, which is likely to have dampened the gains between 2005 and 2010 and conversely, accentuated the apparent progress from 2010 to 2012 as the economy rebounded to its "trend" performance. Thus for the purpose of this paper, it seems more appropriate to focus attention on the entire period of 2005 to 2012, with occasional reference to a longer time horizon for contrast and context. At the same time, the volatility in poverty rates has significance for a different reason: it indicates the high vulnerability of a large segment of the population who are situated close enough to the poverty lines to be at risk of deprivation in the face of disasters and economic shocks. Source: Authors' estimates using mixed recall period consumption aggregates from respective NSS rounds and official poverty lines.
Seeing the trends in absolute numbers illustrates vividly the scale of progress and the scale of the challenge. With population growth, the number of poor people remained stubbornly high at over 400 NSS consumption survey was also carried out in 1999-2000, we do not report estimates from it because of wellknown comparability problems of the consumption aggregate with other survey rounds. 2011-12 (referred to as "2012" hereafter, and so on) is the most recent year for which NSS consumption data are available.
2 Progress since 2005 is also confirmed by an independent, unrelated data source: the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) for 2005 and 2012 indicate a similar magnitude of decline in poverty rate, albeit with some differences with the official NSS in the rate of urban and rural poverty declines. Rural Urban National million in the eleven years between 1994 and 2005. In the next seven years, 137 million people (roughly 20 million per year) escaped poverty. Yet, poverty remains widespread; 270 million people still lived in poverty in 2012. Because India is predominantly rural and rural areas are poorer, a huge concentration of poor people (four out of every five) live in rural areas.
Poverty reduction in India was fueled by rising consumption levels, while consumption inequality remained more or less stable since 2005. The pace of poverty reduction tracks the growth in average consumption quite closely, as seen by comparing Figure 2 with Figure 3 . Consumption inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, after rising appreciably between 1994 and 2005, has remained almost unchanged in both rural and urban areas since then ( Figure 4 ). The Gini indices of 0.37 and 0.27 for urban and rural areas, respectively, in 2012 are on the low end of the spectrum among developing countries.
Rising prosperity, but with falling share of the bottom 40% in total consumption
For assessing progress among those at the lower end of the distribution, the World Bank Group's preferred indicator for "shared prosperity", which is the annualized per capita consumption (or income) growth of the bottom 40% of the population of a country, is an intuitive and useful metric. 3 This indicator for India shows a significant improvement since 2005 from the earlier period, tracking the poverty trends closely. Consumption growth of the bottom 40% averaged an anemic 0.8 percent per year between 1994 and 2005, and increased four-fold to 3.3 percent per year between 2005 and 2012, averaging more than 5 percent annually during the last two years of this period (Figure 3) .
Consumption growth for the bottom 40% of the distribution has however lagged slightly behind the average growth for the population through the entire period ( Figure 3 ); which implies a declining share of the bottom 40% in total consumption expenditure, even as overall consumption inequality has remained almost unchanged since 2005. 4 Thus there is room for improvement in the extent to which growth is "inclusive" or benefits the least well-off in society -poverty reduction in India, even during its best years, would have been even higher if consumption growth in the lower half of the distribution had matched or exceeded the average gains for the population. Interestingly, the decline in the share of the two bottom quintiles in total consumption has occurred even with an almost unchanged consumption Gini, which can occur because the Gini is a broader measure of inequality that takes into account the overall consumption distribution. 5
Figure 3: Shared Prosperity has improved over time
Average annual growth in per capita consumption (%)
Figure 4: Consumption inequality (Gini) has remained stable since 2005
Note: Consumption expressed in constant 2004-05 All India Rural Rupees, corrected for cost-of-living differences between states and rural and urban areas using the official poverty lines. Source: Authors' estimates from respective NSS rounds.
High degree of mobility, where movements upward dominate
The true extent of mobility is not evident in trends in the shared prosperity indicator which refers to consumption growth of the "anonymous" bottom 40%, computed from the difference in (per capita) consumption of the bottom 40% of two different distributions at two points of time and not of the same group of households over time. In contrast, consumption growth of the "non-anonymous" bottom 40% of the distribution would measure the difference in consumption of the same group of households (those in the bottom 40% of the initial year) over time. The implications of anonymity are important to recognize for the correct interpretation of Figure 3 .
How much difference does "anonymity" make in measuring shared prosperity in India? Although NSS does not allow for a tracking of expenditures by households over time, the India Human Development Surveys (IHDS) for 2004-05 and 2011-12, which include a panel component, offer the opportunity for a test. Between 2005 and 2012, annual per capita consumption growth among households who were in the bottom 40% of the consumption distribution in 2005 (9 percent) was much higher than that of the total population (4.7 percent); whereas consumption growth of the anonymous bottom 40% (4.4 percent) was on par with that of the overall population. 6 In other words, the least well-off in 2005 experienced much higher than average growth in consumption. But as many of them rose up the distribution scale, others who did relatively worse took their place, with the net result that the difference in consumption between the bottom 40% in 2005 and the bottom 40% in 2012 was just about the same as the difference in average consumption for the whole population. To put it differently, India has remained as unequal (or equal) in terms of per capita consumption in 2012 as it was in 2005, but with a lot of "churning" underneath in terms of households moving up and down relative to other households, and in poverty status. As Table 1 shows, nearly one-third of all households in the IHDS panel changed poverty status from 2005 to 2012, which includes 27 percent who moved out of poverty and 7 percent who moved into poverty.
The IHDS panel also shows that movements out of poverty dominated movements into poverty: 69 percent of households who were poor in 2005 moved out of poverty in 2012, and only 11 percent of non-poor households in 2005 fell into poverty in 2012. This is not surprising, given the high rate of consumption growth among the (anonymous) bottom 40%, which caused the overall distribution to shift rightwards significantly, lifting all (or most) boats in the process.
A high degree of "churning" amid upward mobility is also observed in synthetic panels constructed from three rounds of NSS data over the period 2005 -2012 (Dang & Lanjouw, 2015a . 7 Their analysis classifies the population into the poor, the vulnerable and the middle-class (those who are neither poor nor vulnerable), where the vulnerable population are defined as those with consumption above the poverty line and below a "vulnerability line" (VL) that corresponds to a 20 percent probability of falling into poverty. 8 This yields a VL that is about 72 percent higher than the national poverty line -slightly lower than an alternative VL equivalent to twice the poverty line, which has been used in past work by the World Bank in India as a threshold for vulnerability. 9 7 See Dang & Lanjouw (2013 , 2014 for a detailed discussion of the methodology of measuring poverty dynamics with synthetic panels and its application to define vulnerability lines in different countries. 8 The vulnerability line (VL) corresponds to a vulnerability index (VI) of 0.2, which is the probability of an individual being poor in 2012 given s/he is non-poor in 2005. VL is thus a welfare threshold such that an individual with consumption below this level in 2005 has a greater than 20 percent probability of being poor in 2012. 9 The Country Partnership Strategy (2013-17) for India (World Bank, 2013) , uses twice the poverty line as the vulnerability threshold. It is associated with a vulnerability index of around 0.18, which implies that an individual with consumption below this threshold in 2005 has 18 percent or higher probability of being poor in 2012. Thus the seemingly arbitrary standard of twice the poverty line is associated with an estimated risk of becoming poor that is close to the 20 percent risk threshold often used to define vulnerability lines in recent research. (a) VL corresponding to vulnerability index 0.2 (b) VL corresponding to 2 * PL Notes: 1) Vulnerable are those above the (monthly) Poverty Line (PL) and below the Vulnerability Line (VL). Middle-class are those above VL. 2) Left panel: VL is given by Pr{Y 1 <PL|PL<Y 0 <VL} = 0.2, where Y t is the consumption of the individual in period t (0, 1) and Z t is the PL in period t. VL thus corresponds to a vulnerability index (VI) of 0.2, where VI is the probability of an individual being poor in 2011-12, given s/he is nonpoor in 2004-05. Right panel: uses a VL of (2*PL), which corresponds to a VI of about 0.18. All numbers are estimated with synthetic panel data and weighted with population weights, where the first survey round is used as the base year. Source: Based on Table 7 , Dang & Lanjouw (2015a) Figure 5a shows that 52 percent of the population changed status from 2005 to 2012, using the lower VL. As in the IHDS panel, upward mobility (35 percent of the population) is much more common than downward mobility (16 percent). Upward mobility is seen among an estimated 58 percent and 34 percent of the poor and vulnerable groups of 2005, respectively, compared to downward mobility among 20 percent of the vulnerable group and 36 percent of the middle-class group, when the lower VL is used. The higher VL of twice the poverty line yields similar patterns (Figure 5b ). 10
An emerging middle-class, but two-thirds remain poor or vulnerable to falling back With upward mobility, the middle class has expanded sharply. At the lower VL, the middle class increased from 23 percent to 34 percent of the population ( Figure 6 ). 11 However, the share of the vulnerable population has remained stubbornly high at two-fifths or more of the population in both years, reflecting the fact that a large number of people who have escaped poverty still have consumption levels that are precariously close to the poverty line. Among those who were poor in 2004, 58 percent are estimated to have exited poverty by 2012, but only a small minority among them had moved into middleclass (6 or 3 percent of the population, depending on the VL used). Those who are in the vulnerable group struggle to rise into middle-class, despite the opportunities afforded by rapid economic growth. Of those who were vulnerable in 2005, 45 percent (55 percent using the higher VL) remain vulnerable in 2012; and among those who remain in the same status in both periods, the vulnerable are the largest group ( Figure  5 ).
Figure 6: As poverty fell, share of the vulnerable population rose slightly and the middle-class expanded
(using two different thresholds of "vulnerability" or "middle-class")
Notes: See notes to Figure 5 . Source: Based on Table 7 , Dang & Lanjouw (2015a) Vietnam, a middle-income country that has been one of the strongest performers in poverty reduction, provides an interesting contrast to India's experience and shows that lifting people out of poverty is not enough. Using similar measures, Dang and Lanjouw (2015b) show that India compares well with Vietnam in the degree of upward mobility. Both countries saw similar shares of the population moving out of poverty and vulnerable moving into the middle class. 12 But downward mobility was also much more common in India, reflecting the still high levels of vulnerability to slipping back into poverty (Dang & Lanjouw, 2015b) .
Reducing vulnerability would require understanding the factors that influence the direction and extent of mobility of households, starting with the observable characteristics that typically matter for the likelihood of being poor, such as education and occupation of the household head, household location, and the social group the household belongs to. Dang & Lanjouw (2015a) find that more education, being employed as a salaried or wage worker (as opposed to self-employment in or outside agriculture), living in urban areas, and belonging to social groups other than the scheduled castes and tribes are all associated 12 See Dang & Lanjouw (2015b) for their findings on Vietnam and the United States, referring to more detailed results in Dang & Lanjouw (2014) . Interestingly, the United States experienced a two percentage point decline in the share of the middle-class between 2004 and 2008, along with a roughly one percentage point increase in the share of the poor and the vulnerable, in a large part due to the financial crisis of 2008. Comparisons must however be qualified by the fact that while the same vulnerability index of 0.2 is used to define the vulnerability thresholds for all three countries, the national poverty lines they are anchored to are quite different. As a result, the line separating the middle-class from the vulnerable in the United States, and to a lesser degree in Vietnam, indicate a higher living standard than in India when adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). with higher-than-average chances of upward mobility, and symmetrically, lower than average chances of downward mobility. For example, the likelihood of upward mobility is significantly higher and that of downward mobility lower when the household head has secondary or higher level education as opposed to education at middle-school or lower levels.
Data uncertainties cloud the assessment of poverty, shared prosperity, and (especially) inequality Important caveats apply to India's estimates of inequality: when income rather than NSS consumption data are used, inequality in India appears to be lower than high-inequality countries like South Africa, Brazil and Colombia, but comparable with income inequality in Peru and Ecuador, and higher than in the Russian Federation, Turkey, and the United States. 13 Why the gap between India's income and consumption Gini measures of inequality is so large remains to be explained, but this at a minimum casts doubt on the oft-rehearsed notion that inequality is low in India. In addition, it is likely that income (or consumption) distribution from household surveys can underestimate the true extent of inequality due to under-reporting of top incomes (or consumption). Research using Indian tax return data over the period 1922-2000 shows a rising share of top income earners in total income from the mid-1980s to 2000. 14 This would have led to greater underestimation of inequality over time if top income earners are insufficiently captured in the NSS data. Under-reporting of top incomes, however, is likely to have less bearing on the lower end of the distribution and therefore on poverty and shared prosperity estimates and trends.
One symptom of under-reporting is the large gap in levels and growth rates of mean consumption per person from the NSS and the private consumption component of the National Accounts Statistics (NAS), which have been diverging since the early 1990s (the 2010 to 2012 period is an exception). In levels, aggregate household consumption implied by the NSS is less than half that of the household component of the NAS. Such a gap is unusually large by international standards. The extent of bias in poverty, shared prosperity and inequality estimates depends on how much of the discrepancy is attributed to the NSS or the NAS. It is notable that changes in recall period for collecting consumption data -from URP to MRP and now MMRP -have helped close the gap between the NSS and NAS consumption aggregates. 15 However, some of the gap in consumption is due to errors in NAS consumption (which is determined residually in India). Choosing between the NSS and NAS is not easy and well beyond the scope of this paper. With the available evidence, it is likely that the surveys do a better job of measuring poverty than inequality. Shared prosperity estimates could also be biased downward if NSS does not measure well the consumption growth of the bottom 40%. However, the difference between consumption of the bottom 40% and the rest (an indication of the degree to which growth is inclusive) could be larger still if underestimation is greater for richer households.
Mixed progress in non-monetary dimensions of welfare
Since the multi-dimensional aspect of poverty may not be fully captured by monetary indicators, trends in non-monetary indicators should be considered as well to get a more complete picture of the evolution of well-being in a country. In addition to their intrinsic value, non-monetary aspects of welfare have an instrumental value in reducing monetary poverty and vulnerability. With a sizeable segment of the Indian population estimated as being poor or vulnerable, improving human capability through better education, healthcare and access to basic services, to name a few, can create self-sustaining pathways out of poverty and vulnerability traps.
In India, the rapid decline in consumption poverty has been accompanied by similar progress in some, but not all, of the key non-monetary dimensions of welfare. Between 2005 and 2012, significant improvements occurred in infant and child (under age 5) mortality rates, literacy rate among working adults, and the share of children under age 5 who are not underweight; whereas progress in access to piped water, sanitation and reducing stunting among children under age 5 has been much slower ( Figure  7a ). While consumption poverty declined faster during 2005-2012 from the previous decade, no such acceleration is seen for non-monetary indicators (Figure 7b ).
Education attainment among adults has risen appreciably since the mid-2000s, mainly due to increase in the share of adults who have completed at least secondary school. The decline in illiteracy among adults -from 38 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2012 -is matched by a 9 percent increase in the share of adults who have completed secondary education or more during this period ( Figure 8 ). This indicates a positive trend of skilling of the Indian labor force as secondary school enrollments and completion have increased over the years. This trend could also have an impact in terms of reducing vulnerability, given that secondary education among household heads is associated with higher chances of upward mobility and lower chances of downward mobility for the household, as mentioned earlier. Poverty rates declined between 1994 and 2012 across all major states in India. Furthermore, as Figure  9a shows, the acceleration in pace of poverty decline since 2005 is evident in nearly every state, including states classified as "low-income states" (LIS). 17 Gains in shared prosperity have also been widespread as annual consumption growth of bottom 40% was higher during 2005-2012 than during 1994-2005 in all large states with the exception of four, two of which are LIS (Figure 9b ).
There is some degree of convergence in absolute changes in poverty rates across states, which implies that poorer states are gradually closing the gaps with richer states in the incidence of poverty. States with initially higher poverty rates experienced greater absolute reductions between 1994 and 2005 as well as between 2005 and 2012, with the rate of convergence rising in the latter period (see Figure A-1, Annex) . However, absolute changes to measure catch-up can be misleading, given the vastly different initial levels of poverty across states. It turns out that states with initially higher poverty rates saw smaller percentage declines in poverty rates in both periods, indicating that there was divergence rather than convergence in terms of relative declines (see Figure A -2, Annex). Thus at current rates of poverty reduction in the states, the poorer states will not be able to catch up fully with the richer states in poverty rates. For poverty rates to fully converge across states, poverty reduction in the poorer states, which include almost all LIS, must accelerate. Poorer states, which include all LIS with the exception of Rajasthan, are particularly lagging in reducing the share of their population living that is vulnerable to falling back into poverty. The share of the population below the "vulnerability line" (2*PL) fell faster during 2005-2012 than 1994-2005 in all states, but at a slower rate in LIS compared to other states in most cases (Figure 10a ). As a result, the vulnerable of India as well as the bottom 40% -given the large overlap between these two groups -are increasingly concentrated in the LIS. Every LIS, with the sole exception of Orissa, accounted for a larger share of the national bottom 40% in 2012 compared to 1994 (Figure 10b ).
The distribution of the poor across states depends on the poverty rates as well as the relative size of state populations. The combination of both these factors lead to Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh accounting for 44 percent of the poor of the country in 2012. The ranking of states by the number of poor is quite different from the ranking by poverty rates (Figure 11 ). High-income states Maharashtra and West Bengal are among the five states with the highest share of the poor population, even though they are not among the top seven states by poverty rate. Across Indian states, the last two decades saw encouraging trends in how growth translates into poverty reduction (Nayyar 2014) . 18 First, state level growth, in terms of aggregate economic activity as well as household consumption, had a strong and positive association with the pace of poverty reduction. Between 1994 and 2012, states with higher rates of growth of per capita income (Net State Domestic Product or NSDP) had higher rates of poverty reduction on average, an association that also holds strongly for growth of household per capita consumption. 19 Second, poverty reduction became more responsive to growth over time -elasticity of poverty reduction to growth in per capita NSDP and household per capita consumption increased during 2005-2012 relative to 1994-2005 in almost all states. 20 The rate at which growth translated into poverty reduction varied widely across states, with the growth elasticity of poverty reduction ranging from -0.5 to -1.7 during 1994-2012 (Nayyar, 2014) . Elasticity patterns across states highlight two important challenges: relatively low elasticity in the LIS (Rajasthan being the sole exception), and lower effectiveness of growth in lifting people out of vulnerability (2*PL) than out of poverty. 21 The first challenge is a key reason why the LIS are not converging in the rate of poverty reduction with other states. That said, there is a lot of variation in elasticities among the set of higher income states. Elasticity is not strongly correlated with state-level growth in per capita incomes 15 either. 22 The second challenge is seen in the generally lower range of elasticities when the vulnerability line of 2*PL is used, which suggests that on average, economic growth has been less efficient in lifting people into middle-class than it has in lifting people out of poverty. Most LIS do relatively poorly on this metric as well, as do several of the other states.
India and the rest of the developing world in poverty reduction
Reduction in extreme poverty in India has exceeded the pace for the developing world since 2005
Since 2005, India has exceeded the pace of the developing world as a whole -as well as middle-income countries (MICs) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) -in reducing extreme poverty defined by the international poverty line of $1.90/day (2011 PPP) . 23 This marks a change from the decade of the 1990s, when extreme poverty reduced in India at a rate on par with the developing world but lagged behind MICs and the sub-group of LMICs that India is a part of ( Figure 12 ). Comparisons with individual countries in South Asia and India's MIC peers illustrate this positive trend, which however falls short of the rate of progress seen among the best performers. Extreme poverty reduction in India since 2005 exceeded the rate of progress in its neighbors Sri Lanka and Pakistan and some of its MIC peers (e.g. Indonesia, Bolivia and the Philippines), but lagged behind strong performers like Vietnam, Bhutan and Nepal (see Figure A-4, Annex) .
In absolute numbers, India accounts for the largest number of global poor and also the largest number of people who have recently escaped poverty. Between 2005 and 2012, 164 million people moved out of poverty (Figure 13 ), a number that matches the combined population of Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 24 As the rate of reduction has outpaced the rest of the developing world, India's share in the total number of world poor at the international poverty line fell from 30 percent in 2005 to 26 percent in 2012 ( Figure 13 ). The decline in this share came during 2010-12, after India's share had increased from 23 percent in 1993 to 31 percent of the world's poor population in 2010. 25 
Shared prosperity indicator for India was just below the median among developing countries
Consumption growth for the bottom 40% in India averaged 3.2 percent annually between 2005 and 2012. 26 While this was a significant improvement from preceding years, the performance was about the average among developing countries and middle-income countries (MICs) during this period (Figure 14) . The rate for India was slightly below the median of 3.35 percent across the 62 developing countries for which data are available for roughly comparable years. 27
Among MICs -a group to which India belongs as a lower-MIC -India's progress in shared prosperity was on par with the median of bottom 40% growth rates for this group. Compared to upper MICs, a group that India aspires to belong to, India's bottom 40% grew at a rate well below the median rate (4.09 percent) for the group. To pick a few examples, the shared prosperity indicator for India bettered the performance of countries such as Mexico, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, but lagged behind countries like China, Vietnam, the Russian Federation, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand and South Africa (Figure 14) . The latter group of countries went through a period of rapid economic growth in the second half of the decade of the 2000s, which was fueled in some cases by favorable global conditions such as high commodity prices. 
Relative to comparators, consumption growth in India has been less inclusive of the bottom 40%
As seen earlier, consumption growth of the bottom 40% in India lagged the growth rate for the overall population, which averaged 3.7 percent annually for 2005-12. 28 India's experience has been similar to that of countries such as China, Vietnam, Turkey and South Africa where the bottom 40% experienced strong consumption growth but at a pace that lagged behind the average consumption growth for the population. By this metric, these countries have "underperformed" in inclusion for the overall economic expansion they experienced. Countries like Brazil, Thailand and the Russian Federation, in contrast, are ones where consumption (income in the case of Brazil) of the bottom 40% grew faster than the population average (see Figure A Annex) .
In general, the international comparisons show that while India has done well in generating consumption growth for its population, it has lagged behind many of its MIC peers in inclusiveness of growth. One statistic demonstrates this effectively: consumption growth of the bottom 40% in India was on par with the median growth rate of the bottom 40% for all MICs, but consumption growth of the Indian population as a whole (3.7 percent) was more than a percentage point higher than the median of the corresponding growth rate for MICs. As a result, India ranked 16 th among 51 MICs in consumption growth of overall population, but only 27 th in consumption growth of the bottom 40%.
The lower rank on inclusiveness of growth also implies that even as India outperformed the majority of developing countries and its MIC peers in poverty reduction, the rate of reduction was below par for the average consumption growth that India experienced. Poverty reduction in India, in relation to growth was lower still overall expansion of the economy (GDP growth) is taken into account. The elasticity of poverty reduction to per capita GDP growth in India is estimated to be approximately -0.93 for the period 2005-12, which puts India near the bottom third (75 th out of 116 countries) among developing countries for this period. 29 As a point of reference, the top 10 countries (out of 116) in terms of elasticity of poverty to per capita GDP growth during this period had elasticities between -6 and -18, while the median elasticity was -1.3. The relatively low elasticity in India was the reason why for the period 2005-2012, with per capita GDP growth that was in the top 10 percent among developing countries, India was just above the 60 th percentile of developing countries in the rate of poverty reduction. 30 Given the size of India and the extent of variation in income levels across states, the challenge of inclusive growth has an important spatial dimension, for which the state level snapshots in Section 4 are useful to revisit briefly. The wide variation in the growth elasticity of poverty reduction across states highlighted in Section 4 demonstrates the complexity of the challenge. Two important trends identified there -the strongly positive association between state level growth and the pace of poverty reduction, and the rise in the responsiveness of poverty reduction to growth from 1994-2005 to 2005-2012 in most states -suggest encouraging prospects for inclusive growth nationally. On the flip side, the comparatively lower elasticity in most LIS poses a challenge to inclusiveness of growth, given the rising share of these states in India's poor and bottom 40 percent. The second challenge, that of growth being less efficient in lifting people above the higher "vulnerability" standard of twice the poverty line than out of poverty, is symptomatic of the constraints to middle-class expansion in India -and not just in LIS, but almost everywhere including the most economically developed states of the country.
India has made mixed progress in non-monetary dimensions of welfare compared to its peers
While key non-monetary indicators of welfare have improved steadily in India over the last two decades, improvements on some key dimensions do not stand out in comparison with countries that had indicators at a comparable level in the early 1990s. Child and infant mortality rates fell faster in countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Cambodia, where mortality rates were higher than India's in 1994 but fell below India's in 2014. The reduction in mortality rates in India was sufficient to close the gap significantly with countries like Vietnam and Nicaragua between 1994 and 2014. However, the gaps in infant and child mortality with these countries, as well as with the other BRICS countries, remain large (Figure 15 ).
Relatively slow progress in sanitation in India has also meant that the country compares poorly with comparators including South Asian neighbors in access to sanitation and the incidence of open defecation (see Figure A Annex) . In undernourishment among children of age 5 and under, stark differences across 20 states mean that a number of states have stunting and underweight rates that are above not only the average for its "peer group" of low-middle income countries but also the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, a group with much lower average per capita GDP ( Figure A-6, Annex) . Low-income states like UP and Bihar fare particularly poorly, but challenges are not restricted to these states alone. 6. The global goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030 -what will it take in India?
India has the largest number of poor people in the world, accounting for roughly one-fourth of the world's extreme poor (at the $1.90 poverty line) in 2012. If rural and urban India were considered as separate entities, both would be among the top 10 "countries" of the world in terms of the number of extreme poor -urban India would rank sixth while rural India would top the list (Figure 16 ). The number of urban poor in India is about the same as the combined number of poor in Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. The number of Indian rural poor almost equals the total poor population of the four Sub-Saharan For the world to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of extreme poverty rate of no more than 3 percent in 2030, sustaining progress in India will thus be critical. A recent report illustrates this point with a number of simulations, of which one is particularly compelling. A plausible scenario for achieving the global goal of 3 percent in 2030 is one where every developing country grows at the rate associated with the episode of highest per capita GDP growth (spells of 8-10 years) in the last 20 years, for the two decades 2011-2030. For India, this translates to a per capita household consumption growth of 3.5 percent and 3.9 percent for rural and urban India respectively, every year, for these two decades. With these growth rates and unchanging consumption distribution, India's extreme poverty rate would reach around 1 percent in 2030.
Taking into account the recent past, the prospects for India are promising. 31 Maintaining high growth rates (between 6 and 7 percent in real per capita GDP annually 32 ) for the next two decades will require sustained effort, in an environment when the global outlook is not as favorable today as it was in the late-2000s. More ambitiously, if India continued to grow rapidly and was able to raise the responsiveness (elasticity) of poverty reduction to growth -a dimension on which India lags the best performing countries --the implications for India, and for the rest of the world would be significant.
Low responsiveness of poverty reduction to growth in India is a result of two persistent factors: low elasticity of household consumption (from NSS) growth to GDP growth, and growth in household consumption that is insufficiently pro-poor. The first one is a recurring feature in India, where growth in GDP (and private consumption) in national accounts (NAS) has consistently surpassed that in household consumption from surveys so that the gap between the two series has widened over time. The second factor, that growth in household consumption is not pro-poor, is reflected by what is seen for the shared prosperity indicator earlier.
Both these factors have shown significant improvements from the past, which resulted in the elasticity of poverty reduction to GDP growth more than tripling from the period 1994-2005 to 2005-12. 33 Even within the second period, there was an improving trend, with the last two years showing a much higher elasticity due to a reversal in both the factors: the gap between NAS consumption growth and household consumption growth narrowed and household consumption growth itself became more propoor. If these changes represent a trend and not an aberration, one would expect poverty reduction to become more responsive to GDP growth in the coming years, with encouraging prospects for the achievement of the global goal of "ending" extreme poverty by 2030. The rise in the growth elasticity of poverty in 2005-12 compared to the previous decade was also accompanied by fundamental shifts in how the composition of growth -between urban and rural and different sectors -affected rural and urban poverty. 34
Conclusion
In concluding, it is useful to recap the highlights of the findings. Comparisons with the rest of the developing world also suggest room for improvement for India relative to some of the strongest performers in poverty reduction, primarily because economic growth in India was less inclusive. Consumption growth for the bottom 40% in India lagged slightly behind the average growth for the population, which led to a falling share of the bottom 40% in total consumption expenditure between 2005 and 2012, even though there was almost no change in overall inequality. India ranked 16 th among 51 MICs in average consumption growth of the population during 2005-2012, but 27 th in consumption growth among the bottom 40%. As a result, poverty reduction was below par for India's average consumption growth, and even more so for its GDP growth. With per capita GDP growth in the top 10 percent among developing countries, India was just above the 60 th percentile in poverty reduction rate during 2005-2012.
The period of 2005-2012 was also one of high mobility among households between groups defined as the poor, the vulnerable and the middle-class. Rapid consumption growth across the board meant that upward movements were much more common than movements downward, and especially so among households who were among the poorest in 2005. More than half the population is estimated to have changed their status from 2005 to 2012, including more than a third of the population who moved upward. This was enough for the Indian middle-class to grow into the second largest segment of the population by 2012 -between a quarter and a third of the population -as befits the country's emergence as a middle-income country during the last decade. However, because many of those who escaped poverty moved into the vulnerable group and not into middle-class, it was still the case that the vulnerable were the largest group and the fastest growing segment of the population throughout the period.
That average living standards of the bottom 40% of the distribution improved slower than among the rest of the population, even as upward mobility was high among the poorer households of 2005, is due to the combination of two factors. Primarily, it is a consequence of high mobility across the distribution, which caused significant "churning" in the relative positions of households over time, along with a pattern of mobility that did not raise sufficient numbers above vulnerability and instead yielded a rapid increase in the share of population who remained economically insecure even as they rose out of poverty. This is also consistent with what is seen for the elasticity (responsiveness) of poverty reduction to economic growth across Indian states during 1994-2012 -growth was on average less effective in reducing "vulnerability" (by the standard of twice the poverty line) than in reducing poverty. Such a pattern could be symptomatic of growth that leads to rapidly rising returns at the lower end of the labor market in relatively low-productivity activities, but generates insufficient opportunities in higher productivity activities that allow households to move beyond vulnerability and into middle-class. Whether that is indeed the case is one of the key questions about the drivers of poverty reduction and economic mobility among households, which are beyond the scope of this paper and the subject of other research. 35 Spatial differences across states in poverty and vulnerability persisted over the years even though lowincome states (LIS) narrowed their gaps with other states to some degree. Poverty rates declined between 1994 and 2012 across all major states in India, and at an accelerated rate since 2005 in nearly every major state. While poorer states are gradually closing the gaps with richer states in poverty rates, the rate of convergence is low since states with initially higher poverty rates saw smaller percentage declines in poverty rates. The high poverty rates and large populations of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh led to these three states accounting for 44 percent of the poor of the country in 2012. Most LIS also lagged behind other states in reducing their share of population living below twice the poverty line, with the result that this "vulnerable group" was much more concentrated in the LIS in 2012 than in 1994.
Despite its rapid gains, India was estimated to account for a quarter of the world's extreme poor in 2012. The world is thus much more likely to achieve the SDG of ending extreme poverty (no more than three percent of the world population) by 2030 if the recent rate of progress in India is sustained, which will bring down extreme poverty rate in India to around one percent by 2030. The pace of decline could be hastened if growth were to translate to poverty reduction more effectively. That India was ranked near the bottom third of developing countries in responsiveness (elasticity) of poverty reduction to GDP growth for the period 2005-2012 suggests ample room for improvement on this front, while a trend of rising elasticity of poverty to growth over the years provide cause for optimism. This optimism is reinforced by the rise in the responsiveness of poverty reduction to growth from 1994-2005 to 2005-2012 in most Indian states.
In a country where a large majority of the population are poor or vulnerable, improving non-monetary dimensions of welfare is critically important to promote upward mobility among households and create self-sustaining paths out of poverty and vulnerability traps. Recent history in India offers a mixed picture in improving human capabilities, with success on some fronts -such as reducing infant and child mortality rates, and boosting secondary education -tempered by relatively slower progress in others like access to piped water, sanitation and stunting among children.
Moreover, unlike what was seen for consumption poverty, the pace of progress in India in many nonmonetary welfare indicators has not accelerated in the past decade, and still lags behind high-performers among other developing countries. For example, by 2014, India had fallen behind some South Asian countries on sanitation, and these countries made even more rapid progress than India in reducing infant and child mortality between 1994 and 2014. Wide gaps with other BRICS countries and fast-developing MICs like Vietnam persisted for most of these indicators. A particular area of concern is undernourishment among children, with some states, including a few high-income ones, showing stunting and underweight rates that compared poorly with the 2014 averages for low-middle income countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and some of the other countries in South Asia. On the other hand, substantial increase in the share of adults with secondary school education in India is an important positive development, since higher education attainment, particularly at the secondary level and above, is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of upward mobility and lower chance of downward mobility for a household.
The bird's eye view of poverty and well-being in India in this paper raises important questions about the relationships between poverty and vulnerability on the one hand, and macroeconomic changes related to growth, distributional trends and sectoral trends and shifts on the other. These in turn lead to questions about the role of underlying processes, such as structural transformation, including the changing nature of labor markets and urbanization, in shaping the trends and patterns of poverty reduction. Understanding the role of transformation also requires examining the mutually reinforcing relationships between monetary and non-monetary dimensions of poverty, and how uneven human development limits the pace and inclusiveness of labor market changes and urbanization. A comprehensive accounting of these drivers of recent trends and patterns will help shed light on the allimportant question for the future: what is needed to facilitate growth with inclusion to sustain and even accelerate poverty reduction and rise of the middle-class, and to mitigate the risks that might slow down this process?
Annex Figure A-1: Gradual convergence in poverty rates across states, 1994 to 2012
Note: Red: Low-Income states (LIS); green: High-Income States (HIS). Only the 21 largest states are shown (not taking into account the split that has since occurred in AP to create Telangana). Source: Nayyar (2014) 
